

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

ALANA DUNN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NOBLE CREDIT UNION, et al.,
Defendants.

) Case No.: 1:25-cv-0561 JLT SKO
)
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
) TO THE ORDER CLOSING THE CASE,
) CONSTRUED AS A MOTION TO ALTER OR
) AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL
) RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e)
)
) (Doc. 13)
)

Alana Dunn proceeded *pro se* in this action against Noble Credit Union, Fresno based Credit Union, and Fresno Base Noble Credit Union. The Court found Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim invoking the Court’s jurisdiction and dismissed the action on July 31, 2025. (Doc. 11.) The Court entered judgment the same date. (Doc. 12.) Following the entry of judgment, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Objection without prejudice directing the clerk of court to close the case signed by District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston.” (Doc. 13.) Because Plaintiff filed the objection to the order within 28 days of the final judgment, the Court construes the document as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to move a court to alter or amend its judgment. “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed *clear error*, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” *Wood v. Ryan*, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted) (emphasis in

1 original). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality
 2 and conservation of judicial resources.” *Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop*, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th
 3 Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the “sound
 4 discretion” of the district court. *Navajo Nation v. Norris*, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)
 5 (citing *Kona*, 229 F.3d at 883).

6 Plaintiff does not dispute the underlying facts and analysis concerning her failure to state a
 7 cognizable claim that invokes the federal court’s jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff recounts events that
 8 seemingly lead to the filing of her initial complaint. (See, e.g., Doc. 13 at 1-5.) Plaintiff also discusses
 9 actions by the government, such as the “Department of Justice’s focus on the private equity sector in
 10 recent years,” the CARES Act, and loans under the “Paycheck Protection Program.” (*Id.* at 6-9.)
 11 Finally, Plaintiff discusses the privilege of attorney-client communications and the importance of due
 12 process. (*Id.* at 10-26, 28-29.) These topics do not—in any manner—address the findings of the Court
 13 that: (1) Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim in her second amended complaint, and (2) further
 14 leave to amend was futile because Plaintiff was previously granted two opportunities to establish this
 15 Court’s jurisdiction and failed to do so. (See Doc. 11 at 1-2; Doc. 9.)

16 Plaintiff fails to identify any newly discovered evidence, show the Court committed a clear
 17 error in evaluating the allegations in her SAC, or argue an intervening change in controlling law
 18 necessitates an amendment of the Court’s order. *See Wood*, 759 F.3d at 1121. Plaintiff’s general
 19 objections to the dismissal are insufficient. *Cromer v. Songer*, 2016 WL 3351408, *1 (E.D. Cal. June
 20 15, 2016) (disagreement with the Court’s decision is insufficient to warrant reconsideration).

21 Based upon the foregoing, the Court **ORDERS**: Plaintiff’s objection, construed as motion
 22 under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend judgment (Doc. 13) is **DENIED**. The action shall remain closed.
 23

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: August 25, 2025


UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE